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Climate Change, Credit Risk and 
Financial Stability
Oluwaseun James Oguntuase
Abstract
Climate change is one of the greatest global challenges, posing an unprecedented 
challenge to the governance of global socioeconomic and financial systems. This 
chapter examines the climate change science and uncertainties associated with 
climate change, while identifying and explaining climate-related risks, the finan-
cial aspect of climate change, credit implications of climate change, integration 
of climate-related risks into credit risk assessment, and climate risk management. 
The chapter pays special attention to the triangular relationship between the three 
notions of climate-related risks, credit risk, and financial stability by enumerating 
the channels through which climate risks can cause credit risks and affect the stability 
of the financial system. Approaches to incorporate climate change into corporate risk 
management are also discussed.
Keywords: climate risk, risk management, financial stability
1. Introduction
Climate change is the disruption in the long-term seasonal weather patterns 
caused by global warming. How will long-term climate change affect businesses 
and the financial system, and how should impacts be managed over the course of 
the twenty-first century? These are some of the questions that have gained unprec-
edented attention in public discourse as global warming projections for the coming 
decades get worse.
Climate change exacerbates existing risks and creates new risks for natural 
and human systems [1]. The World Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report speci-
fies that three of the five topmost likely global risks are related to climate change. 
Specifically, it ranks failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation as the 
one most likely to impact on global risk [2]. The adverse effects of climate change are 
pervasive and systemic, affecting all asset classes, industries, and economies, and in 
turn, the financial system.
The bankruptcy of California’s largest electric utility, Pacific Gas and Electric 
(PG and E), dubbed the first climate change bankruptcy [3], demonstrates the 
possible disruptions of production and consumption, and reduction in future 
asset values from impacts of climate change [4]. Notably, Mark Carney, the former 
governor of the Bank of England, has linked climate-related risks to financial 
stability. He noted that the combination of the weight of scientific evidence and the 
dynamics of the financial system suggest that in the fullness of time, climate change 
will threaten financial stability and longer-term prosperity [5].
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From the foregoing that climate change has developed to one of the greatest 
global challenges, it is imperative to examine the climate change science and uncer-
tainties associated with climate change, while identifying and explaining climate-
related risks, the financial aspect of climate change, credit implications of climate 
change, integration of climate-related risks into credit risk assessment, and climate 
risk management.
The main aim of the chapter is to enumerate the channels through which 
climate change can cause credit risks and affect the stability of the financial system. 
Approaches to incorporate climate change into corporate risk management are also 
discussed. The chapter employs a systematic literature review approach to explore 
the relationship between the three notions of climate-related risks, credit risk, and 
financial stability toward achieving its objectives.
The rest of the chapter is divided into seven parts. Section 2 discusses the science 
and uncertainties involved in climate change. While various forms of climate-related 
risks are presented in Section 3, Section 4 enumerates their credit risk implications. 
How to integrate climate-related risks into credit risk assessment is the focus of 
Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 explore how climate change can negatively impact finan-
cial stability and how organizations could manage climate-related risks, respec-
tively. Section 8 presents the findings and makes suggestions for further research.
2. Scientific uncertainty and climate change
Since Arrhenius [6] established and quantified the contribution of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) to climate change, the consensus among publishing scientists, international 
agencies, and leading scientific societies in climate science is that the increase in the 
earth’s temperature we are currently witnessing is anthropogenic, that is man-made 
[1, 7, 8] caused by the release of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere. The 
most prevalent of these GHGs is carbon dioxide (CO2), associated with burning 
fossil fuels, industrial processes, forestry, and other land uses, but other gases—such 
as methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O)—are also contributing [9].
The decay rate of GHG in the atmosphere alters as the average temperature level 
increases. There has been a striking rise in temperatures over the last decade as the 
level of CO2 in the atmosphere has skyrocketed. Global temperatures have been far 
higher in the past decade compared with their 100-year average, in tandem with an 
unprecedented rise in CO2 in the atmosphere as shown in Figure 1.
Scientific advances that allow long-dated horizons suggest that irrevocable 
temperature increases have already been locked in (see Figure 2). Moreover, the 
current trends are on track to lead to systemic disruptions to ecosystems, societies, 
and economies [11] and may be catastrophic and irreversible for human popula-
tions, according to more than 11,000 scientists [12].
While the future is always unknown, we speak of risk if the probability distribu-
tion of possible future outcomes is known and of uncertainty if it is not. Human-
induced climate change, its impacts, mitigation, and adaptation are fraught with 
uncertainty. The future pathways for GHG emissions and temperatures set out by 
climate scientists embody both risk and uncertainty.
The uncertainties involved in climate change preclude prediction of the pre-
cise nature, timing, frequency, intensity, and location of climate change impacts. 
These uncertainties also depend on a multitude of demographic and socioeco-
nomic factors, such as technology, values and preferences, and policies, which 
are also deeply uncertain [14]. Added to these demographic and socioeconomic 
sources of uncertainty is scientific uncertainty which arises from our incomplete 
knowledge of the climate system [15].
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Due to these interacting sources of uncertainty, studies of climate change and its 
impacts rarely yield consensus on the distribution of exposure, vulnerability, or pos-
sible outcomes. Thus, in contrast to risk situations where the probability distributions 
are known, there are no well-defined probability density functions (which are among 
the most common tools for characterizing uncertainty) for climate change [16].
Climate uncertainty leads to imprecision in estimating climate and economic 
outcomes. This implies not only imperfect understanding of the ability of mitiga-
tion pathways to deliver temperature outcomes but also suggests that there is a 
significant possibility that the tails of the distribution are considerably fatter than 
currently estimated. Fat-tailed climate events could not only significantly damage 
Figure 1. 
Atmospheric carbon dioxide and Earth’s surface temperature (1880–2019) [10]. Yearly temperature compared to 
the twentieth-century average (red and blue bars) from 1880 to 2019, based on the data from National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration’s National Centers for Environmental Information (NOAA NCEI), plus 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations (gray line): 1880–1958 from Institute for Atmospheric and Climate 
Science (IAC), 1959–2019 from NOAA Earth System Research Laboratories. Original graph by Dr. Howard 
diamond NOAA Air Resources Laboratory, and adapted by NOAA Climate.gov.
Figure 2. 
Climate risk scenarios: Projections of carbon emissions and global warming (emissions of CO2 in gigatons per 
year) [13].
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growth and welfare, but economic mechanisms may also be ineffective in respond-
ing appropriately. This could result in structural economic changes, and banks 
may find themselves facing abrupt adjustment which could be severely financially 
disruptive [17].
3. Climate-related risks
Climate-related risks are mainly divided into two basic sets: physical risks from 
more frequent and severe meteorological and hydrological events, and transi-
tion risks from the process of decarbonization that is aimed at mitigating global 
warming.
3.1 Physical risks
The physical climate-related risks represent the economic costs and financial 
losses due to increasing frequency and severity of climate-related weather events 
(e.g., storms, floods, or heat waves) and the effects of long-term changes in climate 
patterns (e.g., ocean acidification, rising sea levels, or changes in precipitation), 
resulting from continuously growing GHG emissions [18, 19].
Physical risks can affect both the supply and demand sides of the economy. On 
the supply side, natural disasters can disrupt business activity and trade and destroy 
infrastructure, diverting capital from technology and innovation to reconstruction 
and replacement [20]. It affects output levels and output growth by impacting labor 
productivity, speeding up the depreciation of capital stock, increasing cost of repair 
and replacement, and reducing funds allocated to research and innovation [21]. On 
the demand side, increasing expenditures for repair and replacement will, ceteris 
paribus, reduce investment on and consumption demand for other goods. Business 
investment could also be dampened by uncertainty about future demand and 
growth prospects and substantial price impacts [22]. Households confronted with 
more frequent extreme weather events might increase precautionary saving, which 
would depress private consumption in general [21].
3.2 Transition risks
Transition risks arise as a result of the shift to a low-carbon economy (such as 
changes in public regulation, technology, or in households’ or investors’ prefer-
ences) triggering changes in demand-related factors. This adjustment process 
is likely to have a significant impact on the economy and, in particular, on some 
financial asset values [13].
Transition risks are characterized by a radical uncertainty on the nature of the 
low-carbon pathway (i.e., the pathway for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
which restructures the economy) and a more usual uncertainty on the methods for 
implementing this pathway in economic and social terms [23].
Over the last few years, the topic of stranded assets, caused by risk factors like 
physical climate change impacts, as well as societal and regulatory responses to 
climate change, has loomed larger [24]. Stranded assets are defined as assets that 
have suffered from unanticipated or premature write-downs, devaluations, or 
conversion to liabilities [25]. With transition toward a lower-carbon economy, 
carbon assets are expected to suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs, 
downward revaluations, or get converted to liabilities [26].
Estimation by McGlade and Ekins [27] shows that approximately one third of 
the current oil reserves, half the gas reserves, and almost 90% of the coal reserves 
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would become stranded assets if global temperature target of the Paris Agreement 
is attained. While an early and smooth transition results in much fewer risks, too 
rapid an adjustment of asset prices due to a late transition might eventually bring 
about a climate Minsky moment—a sudden drop in assets prices [21].
3.3 Relationship between physical and transition risks
Physical risk and transition risks are correlated, because the more transition 
policies enter into force, the fewer physical risks are likely to materialize. On the 
other hand, the harder the economy is hit by physical risks, the stronger the demand 
will be for effective transition measures [21].
3.4 Liability risks
Materializing physical and potentially also transition risks will drive up 
liability risks [21]. Liability risks materialize when organizations are directly or 
indirectly adjudged legally responsible for climate-related losses and must finan-
cially compensate other parties [28, 29]. Organizations are also prone to increas-
ing liability risk if they do not manage transition risks well as enshrined in the 
polluter pays principle. Organizations whose activities are negatively affected by 
unmitigated climate change could seek compensation from those who had caused 
or allowed the damage and thereby at least partially internalize the negative 
externalities [21].
4. Credit risks implications of climate change
Credit risk is the risk of a financial loss resulting from a borrower’s failure to 
repay part of or all the interests and the principal of a loan. Climate-related risks 
affect all three dimensions of credit risk—a borrower’s capacity to generate enough 
income to service and repay its debt as well as the capital and collateral that back 
the loan [30].
For financial institutions, credit risks can materialize directly, through their 
exposures to corporations, households, and countries that experience climate 
shocks, or indirectly, through the effects of climate change on the wider economy 
and feedback effects within the financial system. Exposures manifest themselves 
through increased default risk of loan portfolios or lower values of assets [31].
Corporate credit portfolios are also at risk, as highlighted by the PG&E’s bank-
ruptcy. Increase in extreme and severe weather events could have second-round 
effects on the price of corporate bonds, and the rise in debt defaults would induce 
climate-related financial instability which would adversely affect credit expansion 
and magnify the negative impact of climate change on financial activity [19].
Transition risks materialize on the asset side of financial institutions, which 
could incur losses on exposure to firms with business models not built around 
the economics of low-carbon emissions [31]. Climate change mitigation policies 
to reduce GHG emissions can create costs for carbon-intensive sectors and com-
panies, thereby influencing the credit quality of GHG-intensive borrowers and 
also credit risks to banks [32]. Ongoing developments in the international climate 
policy arena show there will be more rigorous future global climate policy regime. 
Noncompliance with mitigation policies might become reputational risks and 
therefore credit risks. Hence, both compliance and noncompliance with the mitiga-
tion policies will have implications for loan providers, equity investors, and project 
financiers [32].
Credit Risk
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Literature establishing the link between climate change and credit risk is grow-
ing. Kleimeier and Viehs [33] show a significant and negative relation between CO2 
emission levels and the cost of bank loans. Delis, De Greif, and Ongena [34] observe 
that banks appeared to start pricing climate policy risk after the Paris Climate 
Agreement, while Ginglinger and Quentin [35] find that greater climate risk leads to 
lower leverage in the post-2015 period.
Capasso et al. [36] investigated the relationship between exposure to climate 
change and firm credit risk and found that the exposure to climate risks affects the 
creditworthiness of loans and bonds issued by corporates. Similarly, Delis et al. [34] 
demonstrated that climate policy risk is priced in syndicated loans, especially in 
sectors related to fossil fuel. Jung et al. [37] provided evidence of the existence of 
a positive association between the cost of debt and carbon-related risks for firms. 
Rajhi and Albuquerque [38] submitted that natural disasters are predictive of 
higher nonperforming loans and higher likelihood of default in developing coun-
tries. Battiston et al. [39] found that while direct exposures to the fossil fuel sector 
are small, the combined exposures to climate policy-relevant sectors are large, het-
erogeneous, and amplified by large indirect exposures via financial counterparties. 
Ilhan et al. [40] showed for a sample of S&P 500 companies that higher emissions 
increase downside risk—the potential losses that may occur if a particular invest-
ment position is taken. Monasterolo and De Angelis [41] indicated that investors 
require higher risk premia for carbon-intensive industries’ equity.
5. Integrating climate-related risks into credit risk assessment
There are two approaches for integrating climate-related risks into credit risk 
assessments. On the one hand, there is a risk approach whose objective is to inte-
grate a new source of risk in order to accurately measure credit risk and assumes 
that a risk differential between green and brown assets exists; on the other hand, 
there is an economic policy approach, aiming to foster the transition to a low-
carbon economy by shifting credit from brown to green activities [42].
Under the risk approach, the risk-weight factor is recalibrated for all categories 
of assets to identify the differential due to climate-related risks. The differential 
should be taken into consideration when determining pricing and capital require-
ments. When the objective is to adjust capital requirements as an economic policy 
tool to allocate credit to specific sectors, the accurate level of climate-related risks is 
not a central concern anymore. This approach rather focuses on channeling credits 
to facilitate the transition toward a low-carbon economy. The objective is to foster 
transition by introducing a financial incentive through the capital adequacy regula-
tion without following a risk reasoning [42].
Climate-related risks are expected to be included in all relevant stages of the 
credit-granting process and credit processing. Specifically, institutions are expected 
to form an opinion on how climate-related risks affect the borrower’s default risk. 
The climate factors that are material to the borrower’s default risk of the exposure 
are expected to be identified and assessed. As part of this assessment, institutions 
may take into consideration the quality of the clients’ own management of climate-
related risks. They are also to give appropriate consideration to changes in the risk 
profile of sectors and geographies driven by climate-related risks [28].
In quantifying, evaluating, and factoring climate-related risks into credit risk 
assessment, institutions require risk indicators or ratings for their counterparties 
that take into account climate-related and environmental risks. This is achieved 
by identifying borrowers that may be exposed, directly or indirectly, to increased 
climate-related risks. Critical exposures to such risks should be highlighted and, 
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where applicable, considered under various scenarios with the aim of ensuring the 
ability to assess and introduce in a timely manner any appropriate risk mitigation 
measures including pricing [28].
Counterparty credit scoring requires detailed sectoral and geographic metrics 
to interpret climate-related risks as a view of financial vulnerability, taking into 
account mitigation measures. The resulting risk score can be used to inform credit 
decisions and to create a portfolio overview. The score can also be embedded in 
internal and external climate-related risk reporting (Table 1) [43].
For better integration of climate-related risks into credit risk assessment, 
Monnin [30] advocates addressing the limitations of historical data; expanding the 
horizon of credit risk models; finding the right level of data granularity; identifying 
the relevant climate-related risk exposure metrics; and translating economic impact 
into financial risk metrics.
6. Climate change and financial stability
Estimates of the aggregate economic impacts of climate change and the costs of 
mitigation both vary widely and are highly dependent on factors such as core assump-
tions, model design, sectoral coverage, and scenario selection [45]. On the one hand, 
available estimates suggest that physical damage from climate change could reach one 
tenth, or even one fifth, of global GDP by the end of this century, with considerable 
uncertainties around amplifying dynamics. In terms of current global output, this 
would amount to USD 8–17 trillion. On the other hand, some estimates suggest the 
transition to a low-carbon economy will require investment of between USD 1 trillion 
and USD 4 trillion in constant terms when considering the energy sector alone, or up 
to USD 20 trillion when looking at the economy more broadly [13].
Dietz et al. [46] employed standard integrated assessment model (IAM) and the 
climate value-at-risk (VAR) framework to quantitatively investigate the physical 
impact of climate change on the financial system. They found that without mitiga-
tion efforts, physical risks related to climate change could lead to a loss of USD 
1.  Defining climate 
scenarios
2.  Estimating economic and financial 
impacts
3.  Translating financial 
impacts into credit 
risk measures
“The estimation of the impact 
of climate change and of the 
transition to a low-carbon 
economy on credit risk relies 
first on the definition of 
physical scenarios for climate 
change and for the transition. 
These scenarios define how 
climate change will impact 
the variables that are relevant 
for economic activities, how 
a transition will mitigate 
these impacts and which 
measures are taken to steer 
the transition.”
“Once the impact of climate change on the 
variables relevant for economic activities 
has been estimated, its consequences must 
be translated into economic terms though 
macro and microeconomic simulations. 
This step basically assesses the direct and 
indirect repercussions of climate change 
and the transition to a low-carbon economy 
in economic terms and identifies which 
actors are affected by them and by how 
much. Once the economic effects on actors 
have been identified, the next step is to 
estimate the impact of these effects on both 
their cash flows and their balance sheets.”
“Based on this 
assessment of financial 
impacts on firms and 
households, the next 
step is to compute how 
changes in cash flows 
and balance sheets 
will affect their credit 
worthiness in terms of 
probability of default 
and loss given default –  
and thus also in their 
credit ratings.”
Table 1. 
Steps for integrating physical climate risk into credit risk assessment processes [44].
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2.5–24.2 trillion of the value of global financial assets. For the transition risks, esti-
mate by Mercure et al. [47] put the discounted global wealth losses from stranded 
fossil fuel assets may amount from USD 1–4 trillion.
Physical impacts of climate change as well as the transition toward a resilient 
low-carbon economy pose significant challenges for macro-financial management, 
as they can damage the balance sheets of governments, households, firms, and 
financial institutions due to the adverse and possibly abrupt impacts on investment 
and economic growth, fiscal revenue and expenditure, debt sustainability, and the 
valuation of financial assets. In turn, macro-financial risks translate into weakened 
resilience to physical climate risks and constrained capacity for climate adaptation 
and mitigation efforts. Transition risks are particularly high for countries that 
generate a significant share of public revenue from carbon-intensive industries. 
Lower-income and conflict-affected oil and gas exporters (mostly in Africa and the 
Middle East) are more vulnerable and less able to manage a low-carbon transition. 
They have not yet converted hydrocarbon rents into other sources of export rev-
enues needed to grow and diversify [48].
For banks, climate-related risk factors manifest as increasing credit, market, 
and operational risks [49]. Climate-related financial risks may weaken financial 
sector balance sheets and induce or amplify macro-financial risks, particularly in 
the case of shocks. Such shocks could stem from disasters or sudden changes in 
policy, technology, or consumer preferences. The resulting financial sector losses 
and volatility in financial and commodity markets can adversely impact funding, 
liquidity, and lending conditions and weaken financial sector balance sheets, giving 
rise to negative feedback loops with macro-fiscal implications. Emerging markets 
and developing economies may be particularly affected, given that their financial 
markets are less resilient to such shocks [48]. By destroying the capital of firms and 
reducing their profitability and liquidity, climate change is likely to increase the rate 
of default of corporate loans that could harm the stability of the banking system 
[19]. A recent survey by the Bank of England on the preparedness of UK banks for 
climate change found their planning horizons averaged 4 years, likely too short even 
to account for likely physical and liability risks [50].
Climate change also has implications for insurance companies on both sides of the 
balance sheet: as investors and as underwriters. As institutional investors, insurance 
companies face largely similar transition and physical risks as other asset managers. 
They are disproportionally affected due to the long-term nature of their equity and 
infrastructure investments. As underwriters, pricing risks may arise from changing 
risk profiles to insured assets [48]. According to Lloyd’s of London, damages from 
weather-related losses around the world have increased from an annual average of 
USD 50 billion in the 1980s to close to USD 200 billion in the past 10 years [51].
Institutional investors will be disproportionately affected by climate change, 
given their much longer-term investment horizons. In addition to the climate-
related risks that affect financial stability, second-tier impacts from climate change 
(such as food security, social, and political unrest, and biodiversity loss) are likely 
to be nonlinear, characterized by tipping points, and material over the long term 
[48]. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) [52] put the value of global stock of 
manageable assets at risk from climate change till the end of the century at USD 
4.2–43 trillion (in 2015 value terms).
Climate change qualifies as a systemic event. A systemic event is defined 
in economics by three essential elements: a shock, which can be a broad shock 
simultaneously affecting a wide range of institutions, or a limited shock followed 
by an important domino effect; contagion effects through a web of interrelations; 
and the endogenous nature of this shock, meaning that it is caused by cumulated 
disequilibria over time [53].
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Three fundamental reasons at least can justify this transposition of the finan-
cial concept of systemic risk to climate change. First, climate change impacts are 
systemic in nature. They affect the whole planet, in most of its dimensions. They 
have the ability to profoundly change the earth system as we currently know it. 
The second is the radical uncertainty. Historical data provide no useful guidance 
to future climate events or/and outcomes. Finally, the notion of a climate systemic 
risk at world scale provides a powerful new rationale in the debate on international 
monetary reform [53].
Climate and financial fragilities reinforce each other. They are intertwined into 
positive feedback loops so that climate systemic risks also incur financial systemic 
risks. Financial fragility to external risks may increase climate fragility through 
negative externality effects. Conversely, climate fragility incurs new risks that may 
reinforce financial fragility, as Figure 3 illustrates. The realization of a climate 
systemic risk translates into potential financial turmoil and this in turn can increase 
around the provision of the ultimate liquidity [53].
Physical and transition risk drivers impact economic activities, which in turn 
impact the financial system. This impact can occur directly through, for example, 
lower corporate profitability or the devaluation of assets, or indirectly, through 
macro-financial changes [28]. Climate-related risks—in particular, transition 
risks—are actually closer to being in a state of uncertainty. Further uncertainty 
is created by the highly interconnected nature of the modern financial system. 
Interlinkages among financial institutions—both banks and nonbanks—can 
amplify both positive and negative shocks and significantly decrease the accuracy 
of default probabilities [54].
Physical risks can cause economic costs and financial losses across different 
financial portfolios (e.g., loans, equities, and bonds) and also affect the expecta-
tion of future losses, which can threaten the solvency of households, businesses, 
and governments and therefore financial institutions [18]. The exposure of 
financial institutions to physical risks can trigger contagion and asset devaluations 
propagating throughout the financial system [18]. Rapid and ambitious transition 
to low-carbon economy will lead to transition risks with large fractions of proven 
reserves of fossil fuel becoming stranded assets, with potentially systemic conse-
quences for the financial system. Other fossil fuel-dependent sectors will probably 
be impacted indirectly as a consequence [55]. The size of the impact depends on 
the assumptions made about when and how the transition happens and which 
sectors it affects. The risk is that a sharp reassessment of climate change risks could 
Figure 3. 
Relationship between climate and financial fragilities [53].
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lead to a financial market reassessment, leading to a spiral of persistent tightening 
of financial conditions as losses ensue [18].
A wholesale reassessment of prospects, as climate-related risks are reevaluated, 
could destabilize markets, spark a pro-cyclical crystallization of losses, and lead to a 
persistent tightening of financial conditions: a climate Minsky moment—involving 
a rapid, system-wide (downward) repricing of carbon assets which would threaten 
financial stability [56].
The economic effects of bank losses and asset price deflation can exacerbate 
climate-induced financial instability [57]. This calls for a collective prudential 
approach—monetary policies and banking regulations, which intend to act on 
eliminating possible future outcomes more than on internalizing externality, 
because of radical uncertainty [53].
7. Climate-related risk management
Risk management has increasingly become a well-established tool for climate 
change adaptation, given the significant uncertainty about future impacts and the 
inability to rely on historic data as a basis for current action [58, 59]. Risk manage-
ment is part of a comprehensive suite of tools for climate change adaptation, with 
international and national standards being developed to assist governments, busi-
nesses, and communities [59].
ISO 14090:2019: Adaptation to climate change—Principles, requirements and 
guidelines specifies the principles, requirements, and guidelines for adaptation to 
climate change. These include the integration of adaptation within or across orga-
nizations, understanding impacts and uncertainties, and how these can be used to 
inform decisions. ISO 14091:2019 provides guidance for assessing the risks related 
to the potential impacts of climate change. It describes how to understand vulner-
ability and how to develop and implement a sound risk assessment in the context 
of climate change. It can be used for assessing both present and future climate 
change risks.
As part of their overall internal control framework, organizations should have 
an institution-wide risk management framework that extends across all business 
lines and internal units, including internal control functions [28]. The risk manage-
ment framework should encompass financial and nonfinancial risks, on-balance-
sheet risks, and off-balance-sheet risks, including risks that the institution is 
currently exposed to and for risks that the institution may be exposed to going 
forward [28].
Eceiza et al. [43] enumerate five principles of climate-related risk management to 
include formulation of climate-related risk governance, to ensure the board focuses 
on the risks and for climate-risk management, and to cascade throughout the organi-
zation; tailor strategic plans and business models toward embedding climate-related 
risks in risk frameworks and capital allocation processes; inject climate-related 
risk considerations into all risk-management processes to align climate-related risk 
exposure with risk appetite; periodic scenario analysis and stress tests to assess the 
organization’s resilience; and focus on enablers and build capacity, including tech-
nology, data, and talent to manage climate-related risks.
A strategic approach to managing the financial risks from climate change developed 
by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) (Bank of England) entails governance, 
risk management, scenario analysis, and disclosure. A firm’s board should understand 
and assess the financial risks from climate change that affect the firm and should be 
able to address and oversee these risks within the firm’s overall business strategy and 
risk appetite. Firms are expected to employ their existing business strategy and risk 
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management frameworks to address financial risks from climate change, in line with 
their board-approved risk appetite. Firms should identify, measure, monitor, manage, 
and report on their exposure to these risks to their stakeholders. Material exposures 
should be included in their Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) 
or Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA). Where appropriate, the PRA expects 
firms to consider a range of quantitative and qualitative tools and metrics to monitor 
their exposure to financial risks from climate change. Firms should provide evidence 
of how material risks will be mitigated and have credible plans or policies to manage 
these exposures. The management information should enable the board to discuss, 
challenge, and take decisions relating to the firm’s management of the financial risks 
from climate change. Scenario analysis should also be used to explore the resilience and 
vulnerabilities of a firm’s business model to a range of outcomes, based on different 
transition paths to a low-carbon economy, as well as a path where no transition occurs. 
Disclosures should be as insightful as possible, reflecting the firm’s evolving under-
standing of the financial risks from climate change (Figure 4) [60].
Similar good practices of governance and climate-related risk management 
recommended by the French Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority 
(Banque de France) [61] include the following: integration of climate-related 
risks, including their implementation and monitoring, into the strategy of institu-
tions; the internal organization of institutions, both in terms of the allocation of 
responsibility over all business lines, and in terms of the structuring of climate risk 
control, should align with the institutions’ strategic orientations; full integration 
of the material risks induced by climate change into the risk appetite framework of 
the institution, and also mobilization of appropriate tools to allow for a thorough 
assessment of these risks; and disclosure of the institution’s strategy and its risk 
management mechanisms with regard to climate change to ensure both a better 
understanding and a better integration of climate-related risks.
8. Conclusion
Climate change is rapidly proceeding, and climate-related risks are being 
exacerbated. While the mechanisms of physical climate change and the possible 
impacts are scientifically well understood, the specific estimates of these impacts 
are associated with uncertainty.
Climate change will affect all sectors of the economy, and it is relevant to 
investors and financial institutions, posing an unprecedented challenge to the 
governance of global socioeconomic and financial systems. Climate-related risks 
touch on the interests of a broad range of stakeholders across the private and public 
Figure 4. 
Elements of climate-related risk management [60].
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sectors, impact all the key dimensions of credit risk, and are the main channels 
through which climate change can affect financial stability.
This chapter establishes the need for organizations to have a holistic, well-
documented, and institution-wide risk management framework that extends across 
all business lines and internal units to manage their climate-related risks.
In all, the chapter provides a preliminary view on how climate change can cause 
credit risk and financial instability. As such, the chapter does not comprehensively 
address the complex tasks of managing climate-related risks in organizations. 
A more comprehensive study is required on what strategies and approaches are 
needed to manage uncertainties and risks that are an integral part of climate change 
in organizations.
© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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